Peer Reviewed Publication

  • Kim, Doeun, Soonhong Cho, and Chad Hazlett*. Forthcoming. Inference at the Data's Edge: Gaussian Processes for Estimation and Inference in the Face of Extrapolation Uncertainty. Political Analysis. [draft] [software]
    Abstract Many inferential tasks involve fitting models with observed data and predicting outcomes at new covariate values, requiring interpolation or extrapolation. Conventional methods select a single best-fitting model, discarding fits that were similarly plausible in-sample but would yield sharply different predictions out-of-sample. Their uncertainty estimates thus ignore "extrapolation uncertainty."

    Gaussian Processes (GPs) offer a principled alternative. Rather than committing to one conditional expectation function, GPs deliver a posterior distribution over outcomes at any covariate value. This posterior effectively retains the range of models consistent with the data, widening intervals where extrapolation magnifies divergence. In this way, GPs address extrapolation uncertainty, helping to tame the "dangers of extreme counterfactuals" (King and Zeng 2006). The approach requires specifying (i) a covariance function linking outcome similarity to covariate similarity, and (ii) Gaussian noise around the conditional expectation.

    We provide an accessible introduction to GPs with emphasis on this property, together with a simple, automated procedure for hyperparameter selection implemented in the R package gpss. We illustrate the value of GPs for capturing counterfactual uncertainty in three settings: (i) treatment effect estimation with poor overlap, (ii) interrupted time series requiring extrapolation beyond pre-intervention data, and (iii) regression discontinuity designs where estimates hinge on boundary behavior.

  • Kim, Doeun. 2024. Domestic Support for Foreign Aid: Development Firms and Support for Foreign Aid in the U.S. Congress. International Interactions, 50(5), 839-865.
    Abstract In this paper, I present a theory of domestic support for foreign aid in the United States, focusing on the role played by American development firms or aid awardees in domestic politics. USAID delivers foreign aid to recipient countries through contracts with private for-profit development firms and non-profit organizations, most of which originate from America. This paper argues that these domestic firms promote domestic support for foreign aid by creating distributional effects and disseminating information through lobbying. This information includes not only the significance of foreign aid but also its distributive benefits to legislators' districts. Analyzing district-level USAID award data and firm-level lobby data from the 111th to the 115th Congress, I found that the district-level allocation of contracts is positively associated with the frequency of (co)sponsorship for pro-foreign aid-related bills.

    • Working Papers

  • What Money Can't (or Can) Buy: Inward Foreign Direct Investment and Backlash against Globalization in Developed States (Book Project)
    Abstract In my book-style dissertation, I explore how foreign direct investments shape public attitudes toward foreign economic policies and globalization. Canonical economic theories have diagnosed the rise of the anti-globalization movement and far-right parties as a product of the economic losers of globalization. Moving beyond these theories, which rely on the distributive effects of globalization, I investigate how foreign companies' bad actions, such as unfair treatment of workers and environmental damage, undermine public support for open foreign economic policies and increase hostility toward partner countries.

    Using experimental and observational studies, I examine the effect of these bad actions in OECD countries to test my theory at three levels: the individual worker level, the community level, and the country level. First, I conduct a survey at the individual worker level in the U.S. to demonstrate that negative work experiences at foreign companies increase antipathy toward foreign investments and partner countries. In another chapter, I show that exposure to negative information about a foreign company's business practices triggers public backlash in the U.S. This analysis includes conjoint and survey experiments, and observational studies using foreign investment data, firms' regulatory violations, news, surveys, and voting data. In the final empirical chapter, I investigate how labor laws in the Global North influence industrial relations between foreign companies and their workers and foreign investment policies. I argue that institutional tools like works councils, which promote cooperative industrial relations, boost local workers' support for foreign investments.

  • What Money Can't (or Can) Buy: Inward Foreign Direct Investment and Public Backlash against Globalization in the United States (Job Market Paper)
    Abstract While foreign direct investment (FDI) is often welcomed by host communities, there are instances when even its direct economic beneficiaries oppose foreign investments. In this paper, I examine how foreign companies' investments and their deviations from local norms, such as violations of labor laws or environmental pollution, shape public opinion toward partner countries and foreign investment policies. Drawing on intergroup contact theory, I highlight the significance of foreign firms' interactions with host communities. I argue that exposure to information about foreign companies' business practices influences public views on open foreign economic policies and attitudes toward partner countries. Using both observational and experimental studies with a regional focus on the United States, I analyze how foreign companies' unfair treatment of workers and violations of local regulations trigger public backlash against globalization. The findings from the observational studies suggest that breaking host country's norms and laws suppress public support for open foreign investment policies and diminish the positive effects on public opinion typically associated with FDI. The experimental results further corroborate the causal mechanism.

  • Laboring under Global Capital: Work Experience and Political Attitudes toward Foreign Investment
    Abstract Classical factor- and industry- specific models of international political economy (IPE) predict that local workers generally support foreign direct investment (FDI) because it creates jobs and raises wages. Yet labor opposition sometimes arises. This study investigates how the behavior of foreign firms, particularly their workplace practices, shapes workers’ attitudes toward investors’ home countries and toward FDI policy itself. Building on intergroup contact theory, I highlight the importance of everyday interactions between foreign investors and local workers. I argue that these interactions influence workers’ views of partner countries and their willingness to admit new foreign investment. I test this argument with an original survey of American workers who have been employed by foreign firms. The evidence shows that when foreign companies treat workers unfairly or fail to meet expected labor standards, they trigger an anti globalization backlash. Such norm violations erode support for liberal FDI rules and negate the usual pro FDI attitudes observed among economically advantaged workers. Mistreatment by foreign firms can turn even the putative economic “winners” of globalization into opponents of further foreign investment.

  • Labor Protection-Driven Liberalism: Labor Institutions and FDI Restrictions in OECD Countries
    Abstract Foreign direct investment (FDI) delivers jobs and growth but remains politically viable only when domestic labor institutions assure fair treatment, voice, and security for workers. This article develops the concept of labor protection‑driven liberalism, positing that strong employment protections and channels for worker participation are prerequisites for durable support of open investment policies. A multi‑method design evaluates this claim. First, panel analyses of OECD countries show that stricter dismissal regulations and legally backed works councils correlate with less restrictive FDI rules. Second, a paired case study contrasts Spain, where democratization was followed by robust labor reforms, with South Korea, where weak protections persisted. Third, project‑level evidence from the United States probes the underlying mechanisms: manufacturing FDI clusters in states with weaker labor protections (screening effect), and once plants are operating, stronger protections are linked to fewer violations by foreign firms (constraining effect). These findings provide some evidence of strong labor institutions screen out non‑compliant investors and somewhat weaker evidence for discipline those that enter, creating social conditions under which globalization can be sustained. Safeguarding labor rights is therefore not a brake on openness but a foundation for politically resilient integration into the world economy.


    • Research in Progress

  • The Developmental Dividend: Industrial Complexes and Electoral Conservatism in 1970s-80s South Korea -with Paul Bahk
  • Electoral Costs of Policy Discontinuity in Green Transitions: Evidence from EV Subsidy Cuts in Germany -with Sung In Kim

    • Scribbles

  • IPE Timeline while reading Frieden (2007)
  • Shiny App for Pivotal Politics while reading Krehbiel (1998)