Peer Reviewed Publication
Abstract
In this paper, I present a theory of domestic support for foreign aid in the United States, focusing on the role played by American development firms or aid awardees in domestic politics. USAID delivers foreign aid to recipient countries through contracts with private for-profit development firms and non-profit organizations, most of which originate from America. This paper argues that these domestic firms promote domestic support for foreign aid by creating distributional effects and disseminating information through lobbying. This information includes not only the significance of foreign aid but also its distributive benefits to legislators' districts. Analyzing district-level USAID award data and firm-level lobby data from the 111th to the 115th Congress, I found that the district-level allocation of contracts is positively associated with the frequency of (co)sponsorship for pro-foreign aid-related bills.Working Papers
Abstract
In my book-style dissertation, I explore how foreign direct investments shape public attitudes toward foreign economic policies and globalization. Canonical economic theories have diagnosed the rise of the anti-globalization movement and far-right parties as a product of the economic losers of globalization. Moving beyond these theories, which rely on the distributive effects of globalization, I investigate how foreign companies' bad actions, such as unfair treatment of workers and environmental damage, undermine public support for open foreign economic policies and increase hostility toward partner countries.Using experimental and observational studies, I examine the effect of these bad actions in OECD countries to test my theory at three levels: the individual worker level, the community level, and the country level. First, I conduct a survey at the individual worker level in the U.S. to demonstrate that negative work experiences at foreign companies increase antipathy toward foreign investments and partner countries. In another chapter, I show that exposure to negative information about a foreign company's business practices triggers public backlash in the U.S. This analysis includes conjoint and survey experiments, and observational studies using foreign investment data, firms' regulatory violations, news, surveys, and voting data. In the final empirical chapter, I investigate how labor laws in the Global North influence industrial relations between foreign companies and their workers and foreign investment policies. I argue that institutional tools like works councils, which promote cooperative industrial relations, boost local workers' support for foreign investments.
Abstract
While foreign direct investment (FDI) is often welcomed by host communities, there are instances when even its direct economic beneficiaries oppose foreign investments. In this paper, I examine how foreign companies' investments and their deviations from local norms, such as violations of labor laws or environmental pollution, shape public opinion toward partner countries and foreign investment policies. Drawing on intergroup contact theory, I highlight the significance of foreign firms' interactions with host communities. I argue that exposure to information about foreign companies' business practices influences public views on open foreign economic policies and attitudes toward partner countries. Using both observational and experimental studies with a regional focus on the United States, I analyze how foreign companies' unfair treatment of workers and violations of local regulations trigger public backlash against globalization. The findings from the observational studies suggest that breaking host country's norms and laws suppress public support for open foreign investment policies and diminish the positive effects on public opinion typically associated with FDI. The experimental results further corroborate the causal mechanism.Abstract
Classical factor- and industry- specific models of international political economy (IPE) predict that local workers generally support foreign direct investment (FDI) because it creates jobs and raises wages. Yet labor opposition sometimes arises. This study investigates how the behavior of foreign firms, particularly their workplace practices, shapes workers’ attitudes toward investors’ home countries and toward FDI policy itself. Building on intergroup contact theory, I highlight the importance of everyday interactions between foreign investors and local workers. I argue that these interactions influence workers’ views of partner countries and their willingness to admit new foreign investment. I test this argument with an original survey of American workers who have been employed by foreign firms. The evidence shows that when foreign companies treat workers unfairly or fail to meet expected labor standards, they trigger an anti globalization backlash. Such norm violations erode support for liberal FDI rules and negate the usual pro FDI attitudes observed among economically advantaged workers. Mistreatment by foreign firms can turn even the putative economic “winners” of globalization into opponents of further foreign investment.Abstract
Foreign direct investment (FDI) delivers jobs and growth but remains politically viable only when domestic labor institutions assure fair treatment, voice, and security for workers. This article develops the concept of labor protection‑driven liberalism, positing that strong employment protections and channels for worker participation are prerequisites for durable support of open investment policies. A multi‑method design evaluates this claim. First, panel analyses of OECD countries show that stricter dismissal regulations and legally backed works councils correlate with less restrictive FDI rules. Second, a paired case study contrasts Spain, where democratization was followed by robust labor reforms, with South Korea, where weak protections persisted. Third, project‑level evidence from the United States probes the underlying mechanisms: manufacturing FDI clusters in states with weaker labor protections (screening effect), and once plants are operating, stronger protections are linked to fewer violations by foreign firms (constraining effect). These findings provide some evidence of strong labor institutions screen out non‑compliant investors and somewhat weaker evidence for discipline those that enter, creating social conditions under which globalization can be sustained. Safeguarding labor rights is therefore not a brake on openness but a foundation for politically resilient integration into the world economy.Abstract
Many inferential tasks require estimating uncertainty around predictions of an outcome at points not in the data. Conventional approaches choose and fit a model on the observed data then compute uncertainty estimates using that fit, producing uncertainty estimates that neglect the increasing impact of model uncertainty further from observed data points. After describing this problem, we consider the Gaussian Process (GP) as an attractive solution, as it estimates (in closed-form) a posterior distribution for the predicted values at test points of interest that automatically combines information about model fit and how far the points in question are from observations. We offer an accessible explanation of GPs emphasizing this feature, and develop a simple, fully-automated approach to handling hyperparameters that have proven a source of difficulty in prior implementations (implemented in theR package gpss). We then illustrate how GPs aid in capturing counterfactual uncertainty in three settings where model dependency leads to inferential risks: (i) comparisons in which treated and control groups have poor covariate overlap; (ii) interrupted time series designs, where models fitted prior to an event are extrapolated to later time points; and (iii) regression discontinuity, where inferences depend on point and uncertainty estimates at the very edges of their supporting data.